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When Businesses Use Your Photo Without Permission, Here’s What You Do

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I was featured in Malaysian Digest’s article entitled “When Businesses Use Your Photo Without Permission, Here’s What You Do” on 24 January 2018 on what customers can do to protect their personal data. I said the following:-

Customers Need To Be Proactive To Protect Their Privacy

What then do we, as customers, can do to protect our privacy and what rights do we have as a civilian?

Foong Cheng Leong, founder of law firm Foong Cheng Leong & Co. and the Bar Council cyber law and information technology committee deputy chairperson, explained that when it comes to invasion of privacy, it depends on the scenario.

If it’s a photo taken in a public place with many other people like a group photo, it is unlikely an invasion of privacy nor it is anything unlawful.

“If the photo was a photo taken during the business transaction between the customer and the business, it could amount to a breach of Personal Data Protection Act 2010 or invasion of privacy. For example, a photo taken by a doctor of its patient during treatment.

“Also, if the photo belongs to the customer, it could amount to copyright infringement,” he said, while advising that it would be prudent to add a watermark to our photos.

And if we do find our photo being featured in advertisements without consent, we should write to the business asking them to remove it.

“They can also consider filing a complaint to the Personal Data Protection Commissioner for them to investigate the matter,” he advised.


Comments on the Malaysian e-Court System Phase 2

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The Malay Mail interviewed me on my views of the implementation of the new e-Court System Phase 2 some time last year. Some of the issues highlighted below have now been resolved. I am posting this for record purpose.

In their article entitled “Lawyers required to go digital by 2018“, I said the following:-

Foong Cheng Leong, the Kuala Lumpur Bar’s Information Technology and Publication Committee chairman, noted that e-filing is partly aimed at ending the maintenance of actual physical files and saves time with the skipping of physical file searches.

“Before e-filing, the court had problem organising their files and many files went missing resulting the loss of judicial and litigants’ time. The e-filing system also allows documents to be viewed quickly without the need to look for the file,” he said.

Foong said the second phase of the e-filing system had some improvements such as a better online file search system that now includes searching of court minutes, but he highlighted several issues such as the use of the security token which he felt was “unnecessary”.

“Although it is now available at an affordable rate, the use of the token creates a ripple effect. For example, the lawyer now would need to apply for the token and learn how to use and install it, safe-keep, protect and observe the expiry date of the token,” he said, arguing that there were other ways to ensure security or to ensure the right person is filing a court document.

He said the online file search function where users have to pay RM8 or RM12 depending on the court tiers for a 30-minute viewing period should be changed, suggesting that the time limit should be scrapped and instead replaced with a pay-per-file system.

The file search function also only allows users to view and print files page by page, but should instead be changed to allow users to download the files to view them directly on their computers, he said.

“The current system still has a lot of bugs. It ought to be have been beta tested properly by users, in particular, the lawyers before rolling them out,” he said, citing as example the timer in the file search system suddenly resetting to 0:00 before the time is actually up.

On the closure of the Service Bureau to lawyers, I stated the following:-

Foong similarly said: “However, the service bureau should still remain to assist lawyers to file their documents. Not every lawyer has litigation cases often and some may even do one or two a year. It makes no commercial sense sometimes to pay for the token to do e-filing. Nevertheless, the Court should allow other parties to open service bureaus to cater the needs of fellow lawyers.”

In Malay Mail’s subsequent article entitled “No more 5am queues to file lawsuits“, I was quoted stating the following:-

Foong Cheng Leong, the Kuala Lumpur Bar’s Information Technology and Publication Committee chairman, said issues that law firms in peninsular Malaysia faced in moving to a new online court filing system had caused the long queues.

During that period, the helpdesk for the online system was overflowing with requests for assistance, with many lawyers complaining that it was not picking up their phone calls, he said.

“I think the long queues at the e-filing service bureau is due to the sudden surge of requests to do e-filing. As many lawyers had problem migrating to the new system, they have no choice but to use the e-filing service bureau. This adds to the usual crowd of lawyers who did not subscribe to the e-filing system.

“The Court was unable to cope with the sudden surge of request and resulted in very long lines. The Court had to limit the number of people who could use the service otherwise their staff would be staying in Court past the normal working hours,” he told Malay Mail Online when asked to weigh in on the issue.

Bread & Kaya: 2017 Cyberlaw Cases – WhatsApp Messages and Customs TAP

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By Foong Cheng Leong
Mar 26, 2018

Over 50 cyber related cases files in 2017 in Kuala Lumpur High Court

2017 had an interesting array of cyber related issues and laws. Facebook and other electronic platform defamation cases have become a norm. In the Kuala Lumpur High Court itself, there were 50 over cyber related tort cases filed in 2017. Many of them were filed by politicians against other parties including politicians and activists. Some were also filed by companies against individuals who had made disparaging remarks against them.

Interestingly, a defamation case was brought up because of certain defamatory statement via an office intranet.

We also saw how viral contents are treated in Court. Can a Judge rely on a viral video downloaded off the internet as evidence?

Cryptocurrency was one of the biggest news in 2017. Bitcoin shot up to almost US$19,800 (RM77,500) in December 2017. We saw one of the early Bitcoin disputes in one Singapore case. Bank Negara Malaysia issued an exposure draft by the name of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) – Digital Currencies (Sector 6). The document outlines the proposed requirements and standards that a digital currency exchanger must carry out as reporting institutions. Notably, Bank Negara said cryptocurrency is not a legal tender in Malaysia.

A driver was reportedly successful in crowdfunding her legal fee of US$15,333 (RM60,000) through Facebook, among others. Sam Ke Ting was charged with dangerous and reckless driving after she had allegedly ploughed into a group of cyclists, killing eight and injuring eight others. The cyclists, aged 13 to 17, were believed to have been blocking the road at around 3am.

These and quite a few others, are notable Malaysian cyberlaw and electronic evidence cases (and some from other countries too) from 2017 that I will summarise over the next three days as part of my yearly tradition of what happened in the preceding year.

WhatApp messages, as much as it brings good to people, it also brought calamity. In Pendakwa Raya v Subbarau @ Kamalanathan (Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. N-06B-55-09/2016), the Respondent was charged in the Sessions Court under s. 8(1)(c)(iii) of the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA 1972) with having possession in his Samsung mobile phone soft copies of 2014 UPSR examination papers.

It is noted that no 2014 UPSR examination papers were found in the said Samsung mobile phone. However, the mobile phone of one arrested person by the name of Prem Kumar contains the said 2014 UPSR examination papers. The said 2014 UPSR examination papers were sent by the accused’s telephone to Prem Kumar’s WhatsApp account.

Evidence by the Communications and Multimedia Commission showed that the 2014 UPSR examination papers found in Prem Kumar’s mobile phone came from the respondent’s mobile phone. The witness from the Communications and Multimedia Commission explained that the fact that none of the images were found in the respondent’s handphone could be due to the images being deleted and thereafter overridden so that there is nothing left to extract in the handphone. Nonetheless, the Prosecutor argued that evidence clearly shows that the UPSR examination papers came from one source i.e. the respondent’s handphone.

Instead of dealing with the issue of electronic evidence, the Court of Appeal held that only real issue before the Court relates to the question of whether the UPSR examination papers are official secret.

In Pendakwa Raya v Mohd Syafrein Rasid [2015] 1 LNS 943, the accused was charged under Section 130J of the Penal Code for attempting to support the Islamic State and attempted to be a member of the same.

It was revealed in this case that the accused was influenced by what he saw about the war in Syria on Facebook. He even joined a few WhatsApp groups which had members sharing information about the Islamic State and their movement in Syria.

He then decided to travel out from Malaysia to join the Islamic State but was caught at the Immigration counter at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.

Admissibility of WhatsApp Chats

What would be the suitable way to admit chat logs from instant messaging applications? Should a party need to get someone from WhatsApp or an IT expert to extract the chat logs from the application? Or do they need to use WhatsApp’s available function to produce the chat logs? Or would print screens of the chatlogs be sufficient?

In Pendakwaraya Lwn Greencity International College Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur Magistrate Department Case Summon No.: 87-309-1/2015), the Court admitted and gave weight to screenshots of WhatsApp messages to prove a mala fide intent by a witness.

However, Mohamad Azhar Abdul Halim v. Naza Motor Trading Sdn Bhd [2017] 1 ILR 292, the Industrial Court disregarded a screenshot of a WhatsApp chat. In this case, the Claimant was dismissed by the Company for misconduct. He had allegedly sent threatening and harassing messages via WhatsApp to a colleague (COW-1) who then left due to the messages. The Claimant brought an action against the Company for wrongful dismissal.

The Company tendered a snapshot image (print screen) of the WhatsApp message. The snapshot did not mention the Claimant’s name, date of WhatsApp message, Claimant’s hand phone number or Claimant’s profile picture nor any other evidence to prove that it was indeed the Claimant who was purportedly having such conversation with COW-1. Meanwhile, COW-1 also admitted that the WhatsApp message that she has is merely screen snapshot/image and not the original WhatsApp messages as she had changed her handphone. Further, she did not screen shot the full conversation between COW-1 and herself.

The Claimant demonstrated to the Court how easy it was to fabricate a WhatsApp conversation that can be done within minutes. The demonstration was witnessed by all parties, including the Company’s learned counsel, who did not cross-examine the Claimant on this matter.The Industrial Court held that the WhatsApp snapshot image does not conclusively prove that it was indeed the Claimant who was purportedly having a conversation with COW-1 because it is undisputed/unchallenged that nowhere in the WhatsApp snapshot image was it mentioned the Claimant’s name, date of WhatsApp message, Claimant’s hand phone number or Claimant’s profile picture nor any other evidence to prove that there in fact was such a conversation. Furthermore, the WhatsApp snapshot image was not proven to be authentic because as demonstrated in Court the WhatsApp message can be fabricated resulting in a fabricated WhatsApp snapshot image of that message. Therefore, there is doubt as to whether the Claimant had a conversation with COW-1 at the material time and had stated the threatening and harassing messages via WhatsApp.

Yahoo Messenger

In 2015, I reported in Rina Simanjuntak v PP (Criminal Appeal No: P-05-256-09/2014), a Yahoo Messenger Chat log saved the life of Rina Simanjuntak who had been sentenced to death by the High Court for drug trafficking. In 2016, Facebook chat messages saved the life of a German by the name of Rudolf Tschernezow who was charged with drug trafficking. The High Court in PP v. Rudolf Tschernezow [2016] 1 LNS 654 held the accused has proven that he is an innocent carrier using those messages. However, the Court of Appeal in PP v Rudolf Tschernezow (Criminal Appeal No J-05(LB)-345-12/2015) overturned the High Court’s decision and sentenced him to death.

In 2017, another lady tried to use her Yahoo Messenger chat logs to save her from the gallows. In Public Prosecutor v Ni Komang Yuningsih (Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. B-05(LB)-285-10/2015 (IND)), the Respondent, an Indonesian woman, was charged with drug trafficking under S. 39B(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. She was acquitted by the High Court after she proved that she was merely an innocent carrier.

The High Court Judge relied on a print-out of conversation in “Yahoo messenger” and exchange of emails between the Respondent and a Nigerian man by the name of John Amadi who was claimed to be the Respondent’s lover. John Amandi persuaded her to come to Malaysia and had promised to marry her. John Amandi then sent the Respondent to India to meet his brother, Price, to discuss about their wedding. When the Respondent was about to fly to Malaysia, John Amandi’s brother gave her a luggage bag to be given to John Amandi. When she arrived in Kuala Lumpur International Airport, the custom officers found drugs in the luggage bag.

Notwithstanding the discovery, the High Court Judge acquitted the Respondent. The trial judge held that John Amadi and Prince are not fictitious characters but they do exist based on a print-out of Yahoo Messenger chat. The 195 pages printout was held to be impossible to be created by the defence at a very short period of time to strengthen its case and it also has a convincing story line.

Despite the acquittal, the Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Respondent’s deliberate omission to exercise a reasonable level of diligence in making sure that the bags given by Prince carries no incriminating items is an act of wilful blindness. There were too many inconsistencies with the Respondent’s evidence. She was accordingly sentence to death.

WhatsApp and Agreements

Can a legally binding agreement be forged through a WhatsApp conversation? In Shamsudin Bin Mohd Yusof v Suhaila Binti Sulaiman (Shah Alam Magistrate Court Suit No. BA-A72NCvC-384-03/2017), the Magistrate Court answered in the affirmative and held that an agreement was concluded based on oral and WhatsApp messages between the parties.

Would a WhatsApp message constitute written notice under an agreement? In Tengku Ezuan Ismara Tengku Nun Ahmad & Anor v. Lim Seng Choon David [2017] 1 LNS 1840, the Plaintiff sued the 1st Defendant for the return of his money paid for the purchase of the shares in the 2nd Defendant company pursuant to a Shareholders’ Agreement, among others. The 1st Defendant had sold the shares in the 2nd Defendants to the Plaintiff but failed to transfer the shares after being reminded repeatedly.

The Sessions Court allowed the application for summary judgment against the Defendants. The High Court upheld the Sessions Court’s decision. The Court had to decide whether a WhatsApp communication is considered as a “notice” in the context of clause 7 of the Shareholders’ Agreement. Clause 7 of the Shareholders’ Agreement provides –

Any notice required to be served by the parties hereto or by the Directors or EI [the 2nd Defendant] shall be served either by hand, by registered post or couriered post to the address of each party as stated above or by way of telex or facsimile transmission the numbers of which shall be provided by each of the parties to the other.

A skillful reader would know that Clause 7 above provides for only specific methods of transmitting the notice. Nevertheless, the learned Judicial Commissioner held that the WhatsApp message was sufficient to be a notice under Clause 7. She also held that Clause 7 of the Shareholders’ Agreement does not require the notice to be signed. Even if the requirement of a signature is implied into the said clause, that requirement was fulfilled by the Plaintiff. The 1st Defendant has never denied that he received the Plaintiff’s WhatsApp messages requesting for the transfer of the Shares to be effected. The Plaintiff’s WhatsApp messages is identified by the name “David” and the 1st Defendant is identified through his telephone number. As can be seen from the WhatsApp messages Plaintiff identified the 1st Defendant as “Tengku” to which the 1st Defendant has responded (via WhatsApp message too). Thus if the Plaintiff is required to sign as evidence of the Plaintiff’s identity, such requirement is fulfilled via the identity of the Plaintiff which is embedded in the mobile phone.

Electronic Notice

With the Government moving to digitising their services, many deliveries of correspondence are done through the Internet. Such delivery is not only limited to email, but also through their electronic portals. But what if the recipient did not know that a notice had been delivered through the electronic portal? Assuming that there is a deadline for the recipient to do something, when would the time starts to run? Would it be when the notice is published on the electronic portal or when the user logs into the portal to check it?

In Coach Malaysia Sdn Bhd v Ketua Pengarah Kastam Dan Eksais (Kuala Lumpur Originating Summons No: WA-25-193-07/2017) and Transmarco Concepts Sdn Bhd v Director General Of Customs And Excise (Kuala Lumpur Originating Summons No: WA-24-25-05/2017), the taxpayers applied for an extension of time to apply for leave to commence judicial review proceedings against the Director General of the Customs Department’s decisions which were uploaded to the Defendant’s electronic service by the name of Taxpayer Access Point (TAP System). The taxpayers alleged that they were not aware of the decision until they accessed the Tap System.

The High Court held that under subsection 167(3) of the Goods and Service Tax Act 2014 (GST Act), where a taxpayer has given his consent for a notice to be served on him through the electronic service, then the notice shall be deemed to have been served at the time when the electronic notice is transmitted to his account through the electronic service. As such, the clear effect of reading section 167 of the GST Act with Order 53 r 3(6) of the Rules of Court 2012 means that in respect of service of a decision where the taxpayer has opted for electronic service, the taxpayer is deemed to have knowledge of the notice once the notice had been transmitted to his account through the electronic service.

Part 2: The first statute in Malaysia to use the words “social media” and more.



First published on Digital News Asia on 26 March 2018

Bread & Kaya: 2017 Cyberlaw Cases Pt2 – viral content, Uber and appearance of an emoji

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By Foong Cheng Leong
Mar 29, 2018

A video clip that was viewed 3 million times deemed to be the truth of an incident
Groupon has its day in court, twice with users not happy with merchants

CARRYING off from where I left off in part one of my review of the interesting Cyberlaw related cases that came to the courts in 2017, I start off with viral content and a case where a video was shared almost 50,000 times. And while Uber Technologies is merging its operations with Grab, it still had its day in court last year with a case in Sabah.

Viral Content

The case of Public Prosecutor v Poovarasan Subramaniam & 2 Others [2017] 1 LNS 1619 determined whether a viral video can be admitted as evidence in a criminal trial.

The 3 accused were charged for murder for a man who had allegedly stolen a mobile phone. In the course of trial during the Prosecution’s case, the Prosecution sought to adduce in evidence a VCD containing a video clip that captured a portion of the incident wherein the victim was assaulted by several men. The video clip went viral on the internet and a prosecution witness had downloaded the same from the blog KITABANTAI into the VCD.

The second accused strenuously objected to the admissibility of the VCD principally because the authenticity of the contents of the VCD is questionable. A trial within a trial (TWT) was held to consider the admissibility of the VCD.

During the TWT, the Prosecution called two bloggers, namely the owners of the blogs KITABANTAI and SIAKAPKELI who had published the video clip, to testify as to the origin of the video clip. KITABANTAI stated that the video came from SIAKAPKELI. SIAKAPKELI later revealed that the video clip came from an online news website called MYNEWSHUB. However, the journalist at MYNEWSHUB does not the exact source of the video clip.

Notwithstanding that the person who originally recorded the video clip live and thereafter uploaded the same in the social media could not be traced and produced in Court as witness, the learned High Court Judge was satisfied that the police investigation team and the Prosecution have used their best endeavours to produce the evidence of the chain of movement of the video clip in cyberspace till it was extracted by the police. The said video clip was admitted as evidence following ss. 90A(1) and (2) and 90C of the Evidence Act 1950. The learned Judge stated that he has no reason to believe that the video clip wasn’t authentic in the circumstances.

This case is in stark contrast with the case of Tan Chow Cheang v Pendakwa Raya (Criminal Appeal No. J-05(LB)-54-01/2016). In this case, the accused was charged with drug trafficking under s. 39B of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952. During the examination of one of the raiding officer, the defence suddenly produced a CCTV recording in a pen drive showing that the drug was planted. On completion of the raiding officer’s evidence, the High Court granted the accused a discharge not amounting to acquittal upon the prosecution’s application notwithstanding that the defence had submitted that the accused was entitled to be acquitted and discharged as upon the production of the CCTV recording, the sole or main prop in the prosecution case collapsed prematurely.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the production of a certificate under s. 90A(2) of the Evidence Act 1950 is not the conclusive way to prove the pen drive’s admissibility. The Court of Appeal held that “to allow it to be admitted in such circumstances in, our view, would be open to abuse. It is not impossible during this era of modern technology for images to be superimposed or tempered with. Therefore, it is only safe for witnesses to be called either to confirm or to rebut it“.

In another case involving viral video (Datuk Wira SM Faisal Sm Nasimuddin Kamal v. Emilia Hanafi & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 1373), the Plaintiff and his ex-wife (1st Defendant) were in Syariah Court of Kuala Lumpur to resolve their matrimonial dispute/issues. Together with them were the family members of the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, among others.

On 20.9.2016, the Syariah Court ordered the children of the Plaintiff and 1st Defendant to spend a night with the Plaintiff at his home. The Judge of the Syariah High Court further ordered that the children must not be forced if they do not want to follow the Plaintiff. After that, the proceedings between Plaintiff and 1st Defendant was adjourned for the day.

A video recording was taken after the proceeding in the Syariah Court had ended. The video allegedly showed the aggressive behaviour and use of force by Plaintiff outside the courtroom towards both his 2nd child and wife. The 1st to 4th Defendants then shared the said video clip. The 3rd Defendant had uploaded the video clip on her Snapchat virtual page with the words “SMF shoved them to the ground when he gave up” whereas the 1st Defendant had also uploaded the video clip on her Instagram account with the caption “A mother’s heartache .” On a side note, this is probably the first written judgment in Malaysia featuring an emoji.

The Plaintiff alleged that the video clip went viral. The video clip spread so widely that:

(a) Up to 3 million people viewed the video clip;

(b) Nearly 50 thousand people shared and/or distributed the video clip;

(c) Nearly 15 thousand people made comments, conclusions and/or inferences against the Plaintiff as result of the video clip.”

The Plaintiff sued the Defendants for publishing the video clip. Notwithstanding that the video clip went viral, the High Court struck out the Plaintiff’s case. The learned High Court Judge held that:-

“The video recording that was published was undisputably a recording of an actual and real incident and therefore, cannot be denied as being the truth.”

“The objectionable words and statements complained of are not prima facie defamatory. In fact, the same do not substantially even make reference to Plaintiff nor do they directly or by implication refer to or implicate Plaintiff.”

In Synergistic Duo Sdn Bhd v. Lai Mei Juan [2017] 9 CLJ 244, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant for publishing two (2) Facebook postings in relation to the bad service by BGT Lakeview Restaurant operated by the Plaintiff. The second posting went viral and were shared more than 9,500 times and was reposted and published in newspapers, websites, blogs and other Facebook pages. The Plaintiff submitted that: (i) because of the postings, many of its customers cancelled their bookings and reservations; and (ii) if the Defendant was not restrained by way of an interim injunction, the Plaintiff would continue to suffer grave irreparable loss and damage to its reputation and goodwill.

In granting the Plaintiff’s application for interim injunction, the learned Judicial Commissioner held that the continued publication of postings on the Defendant’s Facebook would cause the Plaintiff’s to suffer further damage to their reputation and goodwill as the potential re-publication of the postings to potentially unlimited number of internet users would irreparably harm the plaintiff’s reputation: which harm cannot be adequately compensated with damages.

Digital Currencies

Due to the rising popularity of digital currencies in Malaysia, Bank Negara issued an exposure draft by the name of Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) – Digital Currencies (Sector 6). The document outlines the proposed requirements and standards that a digital currency exchanger as defined under the First Schedule of the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (AMLA) must carry out as reporting institutions. This is to ensure effective and robust Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) control measures are in place to safeguard the safety and integrity of the financial system as well as to promote greater transparency in the conduct of digital currencies transactions.

The draft exposure sets out the minimum requirements and standards that digital currency exchangers must observe as reporting institutions to increase the transparency of activities relating to digital currencies and ensure effective and robust AML/CFT control measures are in place to mitigate risks that digital currency exchangers may be used as conduits for illegal activities. Such requirement include conducting risk assessment, risk control and mitigation, risk profiling and customer due diligence, among others.

Digital currency exchangers must also comply with requirements in the document relating to: the identification and verification of customers and beneficial owners, on-going monitoring of customers’ transactions, sanction screening, suspicious transaction reporting and record keeping; transparency obligations; and requirements for the submission of data and statistics to the Bank for the purpose of managing ML/TF risks.

The document is applicable to reporting institutions, regardless that the person is not domiciled in Malaysia, carrying on the following activities listed in Paragraph 25 of the First Schedule to the AMLA:-

activities carried out by any person who provides any or any combination of the following services:

(i) exchanging digital currency for money;

(ii) exchanging money for digital currency; or

(iii) exchanging one digital currency for another digital currency, whether in the course of carrying on a digital currency exchange business or otherwise.

Singapore saw its first cryptocurrency dispute in its Court. The case of B2C2 Ltd v Quoine Pte Ltd [2017] SGHC(I) 11 concerns a cryptocurrency transaction dispute between the Plaintiff (a foreign electronic maker for virtual currency) and Defendant (an online virtual currency exchange platform provider in Singapore) which involves Bitcoin and Ethereum.

The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant had acted in breach of the contract between them and breach of trust when the platform reversed transactions for the sale and purchase of the cryptocurrencies Bitcoin and Ethereum.

The transactions were unilaterally reversed after the Defendant identified that a technical glitch had occurred to the software used by the platform. Consequently, the Plaintiff had lost the benefit which it could have made if the transaction was not reversed.

The Defendant argued that there was unilateral mistake involved and they are entitled to reverse the transaction. The Plaintiff sought an order for summary judgment.

The Singapore International Court dismissed the summary judgment application by the Plaintiff as there were triable issues raised by Defendant and held that “a thorough investigation of the facts behind the setting of the abnormally high offer price is justified in order to place the court in a proper position fully to assess the state of the Plaintiff’s knowledge”as well as “the law on unilateral mistake where computers are involved in greater detail”.

E-Hailing Services

During the hype of prosecution of drivers of e-hailing vehicle, one Joe Vincent Singgoh sought an order from Court to protect drivers from such prosecution in Sabah. In the case of Joe Vincent Singgoh v Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board Sabah 1 & Ors (Sabah High Court Judicial Review No. BKI-13NCvC-10/10-2016), the Applicant, a person registered with e-hailing service provider Uber Technologies Inc. as a driver, had sought several orders amongst which an order of prohibition against the 1st and 2nd Respondents from relying on the provisions of Section 33 of the Commercial Licensing Vehicles Act 1987 to prosecute or prohibit the Applicant from using the services of Uber Technologies Inc. The Applicant also sought a mandatory injunction was also sought to restrain the prosecution, prohibition of the Applicant to drive or make drives for Uber.

The High Court held that the aggrieved person in this case is not the applicant. The proper person is Uber Technologies Inc. Uber Technologies Inc. has not made any application to the relevant authorities in Sabah for the relevant permits or licences. And in so far as Section 33 is concerned, Uber Technologies Inc. is the ‘person’ responsible to obtain such approvals and not the Applicant. It is not explained or disclosed why this is so.

The Court also held that whatever Uber is promoting is unlawful and illegal. Whether the Government will grant Uber Technologies Inc. the necessary approval or not is a matter for the former to decide as a matter of policy and the Applicants are not entitled to come to court to seek a prohibitive order to pre-empt any legal action that may be taken by the Police of JPJ to enforce the law.

However, the Government will soon be legalising operators of e-hailing service providers and their drivers. The Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (Amendment) Act 2017 and Land Public Transport (Amendment) Act 2017 were introduced to amend the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board Act 1987 (“CVLBA”) (applicable to Sabah, Sarawak and the Federal Territory of Labuan) and the Land Public Transport Act 2010 (“LPTA”) (applicable to Peninsular Malaysia) respectively to introduce the licensing of intermediation business. Intermediation business is defined as “business of facilitating arrangements, booking or transactions of e-hailing vehicle (pursuant to the new amendment to CVLBA) and for the provision of land public transport services (pursuant to the new amendment to LPTA). These amendments is clearly intended to regulate e-hailing services such as Uber and Grab.

The Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (Amendment) Act 2017 and Land Public Transport (Amendment) Act 2017 also introduced a new class of commercial vehicle namely e-hailing vehicle. This would include the cars driving by Grab and Uber drivers.

Once these amendments are enforced, e-hailing providers like Grab and Uber and also their drivers would need to be registered.

E-Commerce

Groupon Malaysia had another challenging year. The Court had to decide in two (2) cases whether Groupon should be liable for the payment made to them for the purchase of products and services on the Groupon website.

In Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 555, the Groupon user in this case bought a tour travel package vide its platform from one of Groupon’s merchants and paid RM999 (tour travel package) and RM652 (compulsory airport tax, surcharges and tipping) to Groupon and the merchant respectively. However, the said merchant allegedly cancelled the tour and Groupon made a refund of only RM999 to the user. Dissatisfied, the user demanded the refund of RM652. Upon the rejection by Groupon, the user filed a complaint to the Consumer Tribunal and it held in favour of the user i.e. Groupon is liable for the said amount of RM652.

Groupon contended that there is an exclusion provision in the travel voucher which states that the RM652 charges is to be paid to the merchant, hence, Groupon should not be compelled to pay for monies it had not received in the first place. The Court conceded and held in favour of Groupon, that “it is unmistakable that the airport tax, surcharges and tipping were not included in the tour travel deal. In other words, they were not borne or absorbed by the Applicant”.

In Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 1009, similarly, the Groupon user in this case bought a tour travel package vide its platform from one of Groupon’s merchants and paid a RM999 (tour travel package) and RM450 (compulsory airport tax, surcharges and accommodation) respectively to Groupon and the merchant. Therein, the said merchant allegedly cancelled the tour and Groupon made a refund of only RM999 to the user. Dissatisfied, the user demanded the refund of RM450. Upon the rejection by Groupon, the user made a complaint to the Consumer Tribunal and it held in favour of the user i.e Groupon is liable for the third party payment to its merchant.

Groupon contended that there is no contractual relationship between Groupon and the user in the RM450 transaction and hence it shall not be liable to pay. The Court rejected the argument and held in favour of the user that Groupon had acted as an agent for the merchant and made a representation in the travel package voucher, instructing the user to make the RM450 payment to the merchant. Groupon shall be liable for the damages as the contractual relationship was established between Groupon and the user but not between merchant and user.

Defamation

The case of Dato’ Aishaf Falina Bt Ibrahim v Ismail Bin Othman & 2 Ors (Kuala Lumpur Civil Suit No. 22NCVC-352-07/2015) highlighted two interesting points.

The Plaintiff claimed that she was defamed by the retention of the erroneous information in the human resources information system of the 3rd Defendant (her former husband) and its “publication” via the said system. The alleged erroneous information was the information regarding the Plaintiff’s post-divorce marital status with the 1st Defendant, was kept in the 3rd Defendant’s human resources information system for a period of time after she and the 1st Defendant had been divorced. The first question is whether the publication of the erroneous information via the human resources information system amounts to defamation.

The second interesting point is whether the publication on the intranet amounts to publication.

The High Court held that the 2nd and 3rd Defendants are liable in defamation for the retention of erroneous information concerning the Plaintiff’s marital status in the 2nd Defendant’s human resources information system notwithstanding that the error was due to a glitch caused by its source code. The High Court also found that the publication of the erroneous information on the human resources information system via its intranet amounts to publication.

The High Court however dismissed the Plaintiff’s action for tort of misuse of private information as the erroneous information is not private information and there was no misuse of information.

Meanwhile, in Lye Eng Eng & Anor v Ho Kee Jin (Kuala Lumpur High Court Civil Appeal No: WA-12BNCVC-174-11/2016), the High Court, on an appeal from the Sessions Court by the Plaintiff, increased the damages awarded to RM35,000 for defaming the 1st Plaintiff by sending an email containing defamatory statements to 23 persons including those who mattered most to him, namely, his children, his friends and business associates. The Court also held that the Sessions Court Judge had failed to take into consideration of the “gravity of the libel”.

Part 3: In the final part we look at a few cases where individuals ran foul of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 and some cases under the Computer Crimes Act.


First published on Digital News Asia on 29 March 2018

History of Kuala Lumpur Bar

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History of Kuala Lumpur Bar: The Story You Should Know

The Beginnings

The Kuala Lumpur Bar traces its roots to the Selangor Bar Association which was established in 1903.

Prior to 1896, any legal cases regardless whether with large importance or complexity had to be commenced and carried out without legal assistance of any kind. It was left to the management of the litigants themselves.

This was due to a Circular by the Acting Resident of Selangor (Circular 17.5.1892) in which he declared that “the settled policy of the Government of the Protected Native States (i.e. the Federated Malay States) not to admit lawyers to practise in the States”. Thus, litigants had to conduct their own cases in the courts.

Notwithstanding the restriction by the Acting Resident of Selangor, records show that locals had appeared as counsels for litigants. In Raja Bot v Ah Chan (1889)[1], one Raja Bot acted as an attorney for Abdul Kadir of Lukut to recover the sum of $1000 owed to Haji Yahya, the deceased father of Abdul Kadir. The Magistrate held that the Defendant, a mining towkay, had admitted the debt and the debt was not barred by laws of limitation.

However, the restriction had caused considerable problem to investors in the Federated Malay States. The Magistrate Court Judges took very brief notes and their grounds of judgement were also brief and without much discussions of law and facts.

To protect their rights and capital invested in the state of Selangor, the Selangor Planters’ Association made an appeal to the Government to admit a limited number of lawyers of position and standing to practise in the Courts of Selangor. The Association complained of the utter stagnation in the Selangor Court and the enormous accumulation of arrears[2]. In a letter dated 2 December 1896 to the Government Secretary, the Selangor Planters’ Association stated that they had resolved that “Government be urged to throw open the Magistrates courts of the Federated States to legal practitioners of status and position, the large vested interests of capitalists deserving in the opinion of this Association, more adequate protection than that afforded at present”[3].

The establishment of the Judicial Commissioner’s Court in 1896[4] paved the way for lawyers, who were already practising in other states such as Singapore and Penang, to practise in the Federated Malay States (“FMS”). Their right, however, was not extended to the lower Courts thus in 1897, John Parsick Joaquim, C W Hewgill and Vernon Francis Page (also known as V F Page — a lawyer who practised in Bangkok) mounted a challenge to have the right to appear in the criminal Lower Courts[5]. The then-Judicial Commissioner, Lawrence Colville Jackson (L C Jackson)[6] granted John Parsick Joaquim’s application to have the right to appear at the criminal Lower Courts. Soon, the lawyers were also granted the right to appear at the civil Lower Courts.

In 1903, lawyers practising in the state of Selangor formed the “Selangor Bar Association” with C W Hewgill and G Harold Day as their first President and Honorary Secretary[7], respectively.

C W Hewgill was called to the Straits Settlement Bar in Singapore in 1893 before moving to Kuala Lumpur to set up his practice in 1896. He had the honour of being the first advocate in private practice to appear at the Judicial Commissioner’s Court[8]. The Judicial Commissioner’s Court was the final Court of Appeal for the Federated Malay States during that time and was later replaced by the Supreme Court in 1905.

C W Hewgill later established the firm of Hewgill and Day with G Harold Day until it was amalgamated with the firm of Messrs Bannon and Bailey in March 1917[9], [10]. Hewgill died some time in the early 1930s.

The early members of Selangor Bar Association were active in the social and legal arena. Records indicate that the members were actively engaging the then-Government on matters concerning legal practice such as opposing to new rules allowing civil servants to be admitted to the local Bar, suggesting that posts of Senior Magistrates should be confined to “barristers, advocates and solicitors who had carried on their profession for at least five years at the time of appointment” and extending time to file appeal from seven days to 21 days.

On 21 February 1925, a meeting was held by a group of advocates and solicitors practising in Selangor and from the meeting, it was resolved that an association, also called the “Selangor Bar Association” be formed. The Office Bearers were T H T Rogers, B J P Joaquim, A S Bailey, Vivien Mackie and William George Warren Hastings[11]. It is unknown from the records why these advocates and solicitors had formed the “Selangor Bar Association” as it had already been in existence since 1903.

According to the Rules of the Association of the Selangor Bar Association[12], the objects of the Association are to “provide its members in the practice of their profession with such amenities as may from time to time be found desirable, and generally to advance the interest of Advocates and Solicitors practising in the State of Selangor”.


(Credits: Arkib Negara)

The premises of the Association were “room or rooms in the Supreme Court of Kuala Lumpur”. The “entrance fee” for ordinary members was $15 and subscription was fixed $2 per mensem (per month), payable half-yearly in advance. An ordinary general meeting of the Association was held every year in the month of January and only three ordinary members were sufficient to form a quorum.

This new Selangor Bar Association was also exempted by the Selangor British Resident from registration under the Societies Enactment 1913[13].

It is unfortunate that the records of the early years of the early Selangor Bar Association and Selangor Bar Committee are lost. The earliest record held by the Kuala Lumpur Bar is 1956 where the late R R Ramani was the Chairman together with four other committee members namely M N Cumarasami, S M Yong (who later became a Judge) and N A Marjoribanks. The Advocates and Solicitors Ordinance 1947 (“1947 Ordinance”) only allows four committee members in the local State Bar.

The complete rolls of Chairman and Committee members before 1947 were also no longer available. However, based on the newspaper reports and records of the National Archives, the Office Bearers of the Selangor Bar Association of 1925 were T H T Rogers, B J P Joaquim, A S Bailey, Vivien Mackie and W G W Hasting. In 1934, W G W Hastings, K K Benjamin and A K Sen were elected as members whereas S M Yong was appointed as Honorary Secretary. B J P Joaquim, T Rajendra and J T Toswill were elected members of the Committee and P C Au-Young as Honorary Secretary in 1937.

The numbers grew slowly. In 1906, there were only six members (three English Barristers and four English Solicitors) in the Selangor Bar Association[14]. The six members were C Wagner, G Harold Day, H N Ferrers, C W Hewgill, J H T , C H Downes and M R — all with offices at Klyne Street (now Jalan Hang Lekiu), Kuala Lumpur.

In 1969, there were 238 members practising in Selangor (Selangor Bar Annual Report, 25 January 1969).

The rolls of the FMS Court show that Hoosein Hasannly Abdul Cader[15] (also known as H H Abdoolcader) was the first Asian (and also Indian) name appearing on the rolls (admitted in 1915). However, H H Abdul Cader (later Sir) practised mainly in Penang.

(Credits: Arkib Negara)

Raja Musa b Raja Haji Bot was the first Malay to be called to the FMS Bar in 1929 and also the English Bar[16]. He later became the first Malay to sit on the Bench of the Supreme Court of the FMS and had subsequently been appointed Professor of Law at Raffles College. During the Japanese Occupation, he was appointed a Judge of the Supreme Court, Singapore. He passed away in 1943.

The first Chinese lawyer called to the FMS Bar was Yong Shook Lin (admitted 1918), who later found Messrs Shook Lin & Bok together with Tan Teow Bok.

The 1947 Selangor Bar

Upon the advent of the 1947 Ordinance, the Selangor Bar Committee was established.

The 1947 Ordinance requires every annual meeting of the local bars be presided by the most senior member present. The practice has now been abolished by the Legal Profession Act 1976. In 1956, M N Cumarasami (admitted to FMS Bar in 1929) presided the annual meeting of the Selangor Bar as he was the most senior member present[17].

In 1956, the subscription fee for Selangor Bar was $2.50 per month. In 1970, it was $30 per annum. Such subscription fee was not mandatory and members were able to practise without payment of such fee in those days. The Bar Committee was tasked to collect outstanding payments from time to time.

Under the 1947 Ordinance, local State Bars were empowered with disciplinary functions. Committee members will deliberate on complaints against fellow members and if there is a cause for complaint, the local Bar will refer the matter to the Chief Justice who will then establish a Disciplinary Committee. In 1970, there were 23 complaints against members, of which five were referred to the Chief Justice under the appropriate provisions of the 1947 Ordinance. The Committee considered 16 complaints did not merit any reference to the Chief Justice.

The usual complaints relate to the misappropriation of funds by members but some are out of the ordinary such as:

  1. complaint over the use of a logo on letterhead;
  2. complaint by a law firm against a Judge for allegedly interrupting a proceeding where he had rephrased questions and answers as well, calling clients name, eg “clever” and “cunning”;
  3. publication of law firm names and address on telephone directory which was a contravention of the Bar Council’s ruling on re Yellow Pages of the Telephone Directory 1969/1970; and
  4. complaint by a Judge against a member over his conduct in Court.

In 1947, the Selangor Bar Committee changed its name to Selangor and Negri Sembilan Bar Committee and then to Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Kelantan Bar Committee in 1949.

In 1964, the Negri Sembilan Bar Committee was established with Dato’ Balwant Singh as its first chairman. P S Maniam was elected as the honorary secretary and V C George, H W Tan, Atma Singh Gill and Edgar Joseph Jnr were elected as committee members[19].


Petition file of the late Dingle Mackintosh Foot

With the establishment of the Negri Sembilan Bar Committee, the name was changed to Selangor and Kelantan Bar Committee. In 1965, the name was reverted back to its original name after Kelantan Bar Committee was established.

Severance of the Selangor and Federal Territory Bar

Kuala Lumpur was made a Federal Territory on 1 February 1974. When the Legal Profession Act 1976 came into force in 1976, it was provided for under section 68(3) that all lawyers practising within the Federal Territory were deemed to be members of the Selangor State Bar.

Upon the establishment of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the Selangor Bar Committee was renamed the Selangor and Federal Territory Bar Committee in 1979.

In the 1986 Annual General Meeting of the Federal Territory and Selangor Bar, it was mooted whether a separate Bar be established for all practising members within the state of Selangor. Members practising in the state of Selangor felt that they will be better served with a committee that comprises more Selangor Bar members and furthermore, most Bar events were held in Kuala Lumpur.

However, this discussion was abandoned and the floor decided that the incoming Committee appoint two protem Committee to study the severance of the Federal Territory and Selangor Bar. The Selangor Bar Protem Committee and Federal Territory Bar Protem Committee were then established and chaired by Jeffrey Fernandez and Dulip Singh, respectively.

Written opinions were provided by Mohd Ismail Shariff and Anthony Rocky Fernandez on whether the then-Legal Profession Act 1976 allows the severance of the Selangor and Federal Territory Bar.

Section 68(3) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 stipulates that all members practising in the Federal Territory shall be deemed to be members of the Selangor State Bar. Thus it was decided that section 68(4) be introduced to allow the establishment of a separate Bar. The original section 68(4) is reproduced below in its original form:

  1. 68(4) Members practising in the Federal Territory shall be at a general meeting called for the purpose by a majority vote of the members present be entitled to establish a separate Bar for the Federal Territory and until such time they shall be deemed to be members of the Selangor State Bar.

The said amendment was then forwarded to the Attorney General and in 1992, section 68(4) was introduced to allow the establishment of the Kuala Lumpur Bar. The words “Kuala Lumpur” were added. Section 68(4) is the only provision in the Legal Profession Act 1976 that specifically mentions a State Bar.

A meeting of members practising in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur was called in 1992. About 2,300 members were practising in Kuala Lumpur at that time.

The Selangor Bar also called a meeting to fill the vacancies left by committee members who ceased to be members of the Selangor Bar.

On 1 July 1992, the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee was established. R R Sethu was the first Chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee and he held this position for the next three terms. Saseedharan Menon was the first Honorary Secretary of the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee.

Other committee members were Hendon Mohamed, Roy Rajasingham, M Puravalen, Manjeet Singh and Zainudin b Haji Ismail. Lee Swee Seng and Mah Weng Kwai (both later became judges) were the first co-opt committee members of the Kuala Lumpur Bar.

According to the Bar Council’s Legal Directory (as at 20 July 1992), Low Chi Cheng, Tan Sheh Lynn, Seet Hooi Ping and Loke Dore Lee were the first newly admitted members of the Kuala Lumpur Bar. They were admitted to the Malaysian Bar on 10 July 1992 — nine days after the establishment of the Kuala Lumpur Bar.

Chairpersons of the Kuala Lumpur Bar Committee since 1992

1992–1996 R R Sethu

1996–1998 Cecil Abraham

1998–1999 Dennis Appaduray

1999–2001 M Puravalen

2001–2002 Zainudin b Ismail

2002–2004 Ragunath Kesavan

2004–2005 Jerald Gomez

2005–2007 Lim Chee Wee

2007–2009 R Ravindra Kumar

2009–2010 Anand Ponnudurai

2010–2013 Brendan Navin Siva

2013–2015 H R Dipendra

2015–2017 Ravinder Singh Dhalliwal

2017–present Goh Siu Lin

Footnotes

[1] Arkib Negara — ID No: 1957/0016576

[2] Selangor Planters’ Association Annual Report 1895, Selangor Journal Vol III, page 195

[3] Arkib Negara — ID No: 1957/0066577W — http://ofa.arkib.gov.my/ofa/digital/asset/787570

[4] Arkib Negara — ID No: 1957/0063163W — http://ofa.arkib.gov.my/ofa/digital/asset/786395

[5] In the Matter of John Parsick Joaquim, Esq, Advocate (3088/97 (Arkib Negara — ID No: 1957/0070913W)

[6] L C Jackson QC was the first Judicial Commissioner albeit a short one. He died in 1905 after illness struck him. He was described to be organically sound, and was in good health. He had two defects namely he had little range of hearing and had varicose veins on his legs (http://ofa.arkib.gov.my/ofa/digital/asset/154198)

[7] The Straits Times, 2 March 1903, Page 4 — http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19030302-1.2.24.aspx

[8] The Straits Times, 7 November 1896, Page 2 — http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes18961107-1.2.20.aspx

[9] The Straits Times, 12 March 1917, Page 6 —  http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19170312-1.2.9.2.aspx

[10] Messrs Bannon and Bailey was founded by Raymond B Bannon and Arnold Savage Bailey in 1913. Savage Bailey later became a Judge in the Johor Supreme Court but tragically died after he fell off from a ship in 1935. The firm was dissolved in April 1963 and this led to the establishment of Messrs Skrine and Co by its former partners, John S H Skrine, S D K Peddie and Peter Mooney in the same year. It is noted that John S H Skrine’s father, Walter Vivian Douglas Skrine (W V D Skrine) was a partner of Messrs Bannon and Bailey.The former Chief Justice of Singapore, Chan Sek Keong chambered in Messrs Bannon and Bailey in 1962.

[11] Also known as W G W Hastings. He established Lovelace & Hastings in 1913. Hastings was a temporary Judge of the Federated Malay States Supreme Court and Federal Councillor. He died in 1952.

[12] Arkib Negara — ID No: 1957/0235137W

[13] Application made via a letter dated 9 March 1925, from Vivian Mackie, a Partner of the now defunct Messrs Freeman & Madge and also the then-Honorary Secretary of the Selangor Bar Association

[14] Arkib Negara —ID No: 1957/058925

[15] Father of the late Federal Court Judge, Tan Sri Eusoffe Abdoolcader

[16] The Straits Times, 19 February 1929, Page 10 http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article.aspx?articleid=straitstimes19290219-1.2.91

[17] M N Cumarasami was called to the Federated Malay States Bar in 1929 and passed away in 1962. The then-Prime Minister, the late Tunku Abdul Rahman moved a tribute to him in Parliament as he was an old member of the House. (Hansard 20 January 1962, Vol III, No 33).

[18] Selangor Bar Annual Report 1970

[19] The Straits Times, 3 February 1965, Page 5 — http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19650203-1.2.37.aspx

Farewell for Justice Wong Kian Kheong

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Farewell dinner with the members of Intellectual Property Bar for Justice Wong Kian Kheong who presided the Intellectual Property Court from 1st January 2016 to 31 August 2018.

We compiled all his intellectual property judgments into a book which consisted of 2 volumes as his farewell gift. He had contributed to the development of our intellectual property laws tremendously in the past 2 years.

Many have asked if the book is for sale. Unfortunately, it is not for sale as we have only printed a copy. However, you may download all cases from the book below-

Aktif Perunding Sdn Bhd v. ZNVA & Associates Sdn Bhd

Billion Prima Sdn Bhd & Anor v Nutech Company Limited & Anor

Chanel v Melwani2 International Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors & Another Case

Chow Chuan Fat v Yeo Chai Seng & Ors (No. 1)

>Chow Chuan Fat v Yeo Chai Seng & Ors (No. 2)

Chuah Aik King (Sole Proprietor of Syarikat B Three Technology) v Keydonesoft Sdn Bhd

Dart Industries Inc & Anor v CMN International Sdn Bhd & Other Cases

Darul Fikir v Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka – legal entity DBP

Diesal SpA v Bontton Sdn Bhd

Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd v Fitter Marketing Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors (No. 2)

Doretti Resources Sdn Bhd v Fitter Marketing Sdn Bhd & 4 Ors (No. 3)

DR HK Fong Braindbuilder Pte Ltd v SG-Maths Sdn Bhd & 5 Ors

Goodway Retread Sdn Bhd v Goodway Rubber Industries Sdn Bhd

GS Yuasa Corporation v GBI Marketing Sdn Bhd

Huan Schen Sdn Bhd v SRAM LLC

Hyundai Motor v Sun Yuen Rubber Manufacturing Co Sdn Bhd

Iradar Sdn Bhd v Nutech Company Limited & Anor

Juris Technologies Sdn Bhd v Foo Tiang Sin & Ors

Jyothy Laboratories Limited v Perusahaan Bumi Tulin Sdn Bhd

Kraft Foods Schweiz Holdings GmbH v Pendaftar Cap Dagangan

La Kaffa International Co Ltd v LOOB Holdings Sdn Bhe & Another Case

Lim Teck Lee v Longcane Industries Sdn Bhd

Louis Vuitton Malletier v Renown Incorporated

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp & Anor v Hovid Bhd

Motordata Research Consortium Sdn Bhd v Ahmad Shahril bin Abdullah & 3 Ors

Ooi Siew Bee (trading under the name and stye of Syarikat Perniagaan Eng Leong) & 2 Ors v Zhu Ge Kong Ming Sdn Bhd & Anor

Pentamaster Instrumentation Sdn Bhd v QAV Technologies Sdn Bhd & 3 Ors

Philip Morris Brands Sari v Goodness For Import and Export & Ors

Portcullis Trustnet (Singapore) Pte Ltd v George Pathmanathan_ al Michael Gandhi Nathan & 11 Ors

Prism Berhad v Measat Broadcast Network Sdn Bhd

R Ramani AL M Ramalingam (suing on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of Malaysia, a registered society) & 2 Ors v Deluxe Exclusive Lounge Sdn Bhd

Schwan-Stabilo Marketing Sdn Bhd & Anor v S & Y Stationery & 2 Ors

Sigma Glove Industries Sdn Bhd & 2 Ors v Ong Chin Kok & Anor

Singham Sulaiman Sdn Bhd v Appraisal Property Management Sdn Bhd and Another Case

Sri Paandi Restaurant Sdn Bhd & Anor v Saraswathy ap Kesavan & 3 Ors

Syarikat Faiza Sdn Bhd & Anor v Faiz Sdn Bhd & Anor

Syarikat Duasama Sdn Bhd v Abdul Aziz Ibrahim (Trading as Radiant Star Enterprise); 1st Third Party Tiong Sing Trading Co Sdn Bhd and another Party

Tokai Corporation v DKSH Malaysia Sdn Bhd

World Grand Dynamic Marketing Sdn Bhd v FJVAA SPA Sdn Bhd & Ors

X1R Global Holdings & Anor v Y – Teq Auto Parts (M) Sdn Bhd

Walmar Wil Heavy Duty Pumps Sdn Bhd v Pump Matrix Engineering Sdn Bhd

Getting ‘played’ over games

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I was featured by The Star in their article “Getting ‘played’ over games“. I was asked to comment about online impersonation in Malaysia.

Bar Council information technology and cyberlaw committee deputy chairman Foong Cheng Leong said somebody who impersonates another person online could be breaking the law if the actions fall within criminal activity.

“For example, impersonation to gain monetary benefit could amounting to cheating.

“Impersonation, as a prank, is not a criminal act,” he explains.

Hence, it is considered a crime in cases where the online impersonator asks for money from unsuspecting victims – or as in the case of this latest twist, tricking them into buying game credits for them.

Such an offence comes under Section 420 of the Penal Code for cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.

It is a crime punishable with a jail term of between one and 10 years, with whipping and a fine.

However, even the act of hacking into a person’s social media account alone, whether it is a prank or not, crosses into the criminal realm.

Under the Computer Crimes Act, a person who gains unauthorized access to computer material is guilty of an offence.

Those convicted could be liable to a maximum fine of RM50,000, five years in jail or both.

Hacking with intent to commit further offences, including fraud, also amounts to a crime.

If found guilty, the court can sentence a person to a maximum fine of RM150,000, a 10 year jail term or both.

BFM Podcast: DO WE NEED ANTI-HATE SPEECH LAWS

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Minister Gobind Singh Deo wants anti-hate speech laws that have a global reach, flowing a blogger’s racist remarks.

Your browser does not support native audio, but you can download this MP3 to listen on your device.


Cyber Laws Cases

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I assisted the Bar Council Cyber Laws Committee to prepare this of cases relating to cyber laws. This list is taken from my draft manuscript for my next book “Information Technology and Cyber Laws of Malaysia“.

This list is intended to assist practitioners and members of the public in understanding cyber laws and information technology laws and to contribute to the development of such laws.

(A) Defamation and Other Actions

(1) Email

Nagandran Kalianna Gaundar (berniaga dibawah RAJU RESTOREN) v. Melinda Alison Monteiro & Ors [2011] 1 LNS 466 / [2011] 4 MLJ 224
Mox-Linde Gases Sdn Bhd & Anor v Wong Siew Yap [2015] 10 MLJ 413
Lye Eng Eng & Anor v Ho Kee Jin [2017] MLJU 521
Toh See Wei v. Teddric Jon Mohr & Anor [2017] 1 LNS 445 / [2017] 11 MLJ 67

(2) Facebook

Amber Court Management Corporation & Ors v Hong Gan Gui & Anor [2014] 1 LNS 1384
Foo Hiap Siong v Chong Chin Hsiang [2014] 1 LNS 1196
National Union of Bank Employees v Noorzeela Binti Lamin [2012] 9 MLJ 410
Salleh Berindi Bin Hj Othman v Abdul Hamid Ahmad & 4 Others [2014] 1 LNS 1611

(3) Twitter

Dato Seri Mohammad Nizar Bin Jamaluddin v Sistem Televisyen Malaysia & Anor [2013] 4 MLJ 448
Datuk Seri Mohammad Nizar Jamaluddin lwn. Utusan Melayu (M) Berhad [2013] 1 LNS 592

(4) Online Forum

Stemlife Berhad v Bristol Myers Squibb (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] MLJU 354
Stemlife Berhad v Mead Johnson Nutrian (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 1446

(5) Blogs

Kho Whai Phiaw v Chong Chieng Jen [2009] 4 MLJ 103
Tong Seak Kan & Anor v Loke Ah Kin & Anor [2014] 6 CLJ 904
Datuk Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim v Wan Muhammad Azri Bin Wan Deris [2014] 3 MLRH 21 / [2014] 9 MLJ 605

(6) Hyperlinks

The New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd & Ors v Ahirudin bin Attan [2008] 1 MLJ 814

(B) Criminal Law-Related

(1) Communications and Multimedia Act 1998

Nor Hisham Bin Osman v Pendakwaraya [2010] MLJU 1249
PP v. Muslim Ahmad [2013] 5 CLJ 822
PP v. Rutinin Suhaimin [2013] 2 CLJ 427
Rutinin Suhaimin v. PP [2015] 3 CLJ 838
Ahmad Abd Jalil lwn. PP [2015] 5 CLJ 480
Mohd Fahmi Redza Bin Mohd Zarin Lawan Pendakwa Raya dan Satu Lagi Kes [2017] MLJU 516
Nik Adib Bin Nik Mat v Public Prosecutor [2017] MLJU 1831

(2) Computer Crimes Act 1997

Basheer Ahmad Maula Sahul Hameed & Anor v Pendakwa Raya [2016] 9 MLJ 549
Roslan bin Mohamad Som & Anor v Pendakwa Raya [2016] 1 LNS 651
Rose Hanida Binti Long lwn Pendakwa Raya [2017] MLJU 1212
Kangaie Agilan Jammany lwn. PP [2017] 1 LNS 1640

(3) Other Crimes

Dato’ Ibrahim Ali v. Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim [2015] 1 CLJ 176
Tan Jye Lee & Anor v PP [2014] 1 LNS 860
PP v Yuneswaran a/l Ramaraj [2015] 6 MLJ 47
Reza Kianmehr v. PP [2013] 7 CLJ 265
Mat Shuhaimi bin Shafiei v Pendakwa Raya [2014] 2 MLJ 145

(C) Electronic Evidence

(1) Electronic Commerce Act 2006

Yam Kong Seng & Anor v Yee Weng Kai [2014] 6 CLJ 285

(2) Section 114A Evidence Act 1950

PP v. Rutinin Suhaimin [2013] 2 CLJ 427
Tong Seak Kan & Anor v Loke Ah Kim & Anor [2014] 6 CLJ 904
YB Dato Haji Husam bin HJ Musa v Mohd Faisal bin Rohban Ahmad [2015] MLJU 53
Stemlife Berhad v Mead Johnson Nutrian (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2013] 1 LNS 1446
Kangaie Agilan Jammany lwn. Pendakwa Raya [2017] 1 LNS 1640

(3) Wikipedia

Lee Lai Ching v Lim Hooi Teik [2013] 1 LNS 18
Etonic Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd v Kunn-G Freight System (M) Sdn Bhd [2010] 1 LNS 13
Pendakwa Raya v Murugan a/l Arumugam [2009] 1 LNS 1759

(4) Wayback Machine

Petroliam Nasional Bhd (Petronas) & Ors v. Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 CLJ

(5) Google Maps

Eddy Salim & Ors v. Iskandar Regional Development Authority & Ors (No 2) [2017] 1 LNS 822

(6) Search Engine

Reka Setia Playground Sdn Bhd v Siow Wee Hong [2016] 1 lns 549

(7) Others

Menteri Dalam Negeri & Ors v. Titular Roman Catholic Archbishop Of Kuala Lumpur [2013] 8 CLJ 890
Tan Chow Cheang v Pendakwa Raya [2017] MLJU 1642

(8) Harassment

Mohd Ridzwan bin Abdul Razak v Asmah Binti HJ. Mohd Nor [2016] 4 MLJ 282

(9) Pre-Action Discovery

Stemlife Berhad v Bristol Myers Squibb (M) Sdn Bhd [2008] 1 LNS 273
Neoh Chong Po v Cari Internet Sdn Bhd [2009] 1 LNS 34

(10) Domain Names

Petrolium Nasional Bhd (Petronas) & Ors v Khoo Nee Kiong [2003] 4 CLJ 303

(D) FinTech

(1) Payment System

Tekun Nasional v Plentitude Drive (M) Sdn Bhd and another Appeal [2018] MLJU 516

(2) E-Hailing Services

Joe Vincent Singgoh v Commercial Vehicles Licensing Board Sabah 1 & Ors [2017] MLJU 800

(3) E-Commerce

Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Tuntutan Pengguna & Anor [2017] 7 MLJ 354
Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Pengguna & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 555
Groupon Sdn Bhd v Tribunal Pengguna & Anor [2016] 1 LNS 1009

(4) Viral Content

Public Prosecutor v Poovarasan Subramaniam & 2 Others [2017] 1 LNS 1009
Datuk Wira SM Faisal Sm Nasimuddin Kamal v Emilia Hanafi & Ors [2017] 1 LNS 1373
Synergistic Duo Sdn Bhd v Lai Mei Juan [2017] 9 CLJ 244

‘Hunt’ for critics of monarchy: So what does the law say about ‘doxing’?

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I was interviewed by the Malay Mail regarding the issue of “doxing”.

“Doxing” or “doxxing”, in my opinion, is the act of harvesting and publication of personal information of a person on the Internet often with the intention to, among others, annoy, harass, humiliate, insult, threaten, intimidate, or punish the identified individual. Such personal information may be publicly available or private information. They include full name, identity card number, pictures, home or work address, contact number and email.

The act of doxing may be as a result of the act of the victim himself. Often the victim was recorded acting negatively (such as video of a road rage) and such record had gone viral on the Internet.

The act of doxing will usually result with emotional distress to the victim as the victim will be subject to annoy, harass, humiliate, insult, threaten or intimidate by that person or other person(s) being influenced to do the same. In some cases, a victim of doxing have lost their job, moved out from their place or residence, change their contact details or even assaulted.

Currently, there is no specific law in Malaysia to govern doxing. In the Malay Mail article, I said-

Lawyers polled by Malay Mail conceded that doxing on its own is not a criminal offence, although it could fall under Section 233 of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 that handles improper use of network facilities or network service.

However, lawyer Foong Cheng Leong said this is only true if there had been publication of a comment which is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person.

“Invasion of privacy is also possible but the information leaked must be something of a private nature — not those in the public domain like full name, identification card number and address.

“Tort of harassment is also possible but that must be something of a repeated act of harassment by the same person,” said the chairman of the Kuala Lumpur Bar Information Technology and Publication Committee.

The Malay Mail

Also read Bread & Kaya: Cyberstalking, harassment … and road rage

Tomorrow’s law today: More legal firms embracing tech than before

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Image Credit: AZHAR MAHFOF/The Star

The FCL&Co Case Law Search App was featured in the The Star Newspaper.

Another firm to have jumped on board the bandwagon is Foong Cheng Leong and Co with its FCL&CO Case Law Search app which catalogues some 12,000 cases.

Unlike most law libraries, the app is free, making it a significant resource for boutique and single-owner firms which may not be able to afford subscription-based libraries that are costly.

The firm’s namesake and founder, Foong Cheng Leong, says the app was built in collaboration with another company.

He says that technology which enables lawyers to work more efficiently is a bigger priority than solutions for the public such as lawyer matching services, and tech companies should consult lawyers to grasp what the industry actually needs.

“The industry is still at its infancy, but newcomers may need to go through the Bar Council hurdle to see if they are in contravention of the Legal Profession Act (LPA) 1976,” he opines.

The LPA defines acceptable conduct and business practices for lawyers, and violating it can result in members being fined or even disbarred.

Read more at The Star Online

Bread & Kaya: 2018 Malaysia Cyber-law and IT Cases PT3 – Cyber-crimes and -offences

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By Foong Cheng Leong
May 3, 2019

  • Laws introduced to regulate e-hailing services
  • Sexual grooming enters the books as a new offence 

IN THIS third of a four-part series, I will discuss cyber-crime cases and other cyber offences.

Communications and Multimedia Act 1998

The establishment of Cyber Courts in the Kuala Lumpur Sessions Court saw the growth of judgements relating to the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998.

In Pendakwa Raya lwn Dato’ Mohd Zaid Bin Ibrahim (Kuala Lumpur Criminal Sessions Court Case No. 63-003-12/2015), the learned Sessions Court Judge gave a comprehensive judgement regarding a charge under s. 233(1)(a) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998.

The accused, a former Minister of Law, was charged for publishing a statement which is offensive in nature on his blog with an intent to annoy another person. The statement consists of a transcript of the accused’s speech given at a luncheon relating to the conduct of the then Prime Minister Najib Razak.

The learned Sessions Court Judge acquitted the accused at the prosecution stage based on the following grounds, among others:-

(1) In determining whether the article is offensive in nature, the article must be examined as a whole and not by looking in a few paragraphs or words. This is because the accused was charged for uploading the article and thus the entire article is considered as offensive in character. The prosecutor cannot pick and choose the relevant paragraphs or words favourable to them and conclude that the article is offensive in character.

(2) The learned Sessions Court Judge looked into the object of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 set out in s.3 of the said Act. One of the objectives of the Act is to promote a civil society where information-based services will provide the basis of continuing enhancements to quality of work and life. The learned Sessions Court Judge also considered that the said Act addressed the issue of censorship where nothing in the said Act shall be construed as permitting the censorship of the Internet.

(3) None of the Prosecution’s witnesses stated that they found that the entire article is offensive in character. Two (2) of the prosecution’s witnesses referred part of the article and not the whole article. In fact, the complainant’s police report against the accused had only stated that the article is seditious in nature which is different from offensive in character.

(4) Such article must be examined and not taken without further examination without critical thinking. This is one of the objectives that s. 3 of the said Act seeks to achieve. The attitude of receiving news blindly should be avoided and the new culture in accordance with the purpose and objective of the said Act ought to be promoted.

(5) In respect of the element “with intent” to annoy another person, the learned Sessions Court Judge held that that intent has to be proved and no evidence has been adduced to prove the same. As for the element “annoy another person”, the learned Sessions Court Judge found that the complainant did not feel annoyed when he read the article. The learned Sessions Court Judge held that annoyance or anger or dissatisfaction would appear spontaneously when the article is read. The learned Sessions Court Judge found that the article is intended for blog readers to garner support for what it is written for i.e. to give support to Prime Minister Dr Mahathir.

(6) The charge is defective as the prosecution failed to state clearly in the charges sheet who is the person intended to be annoyed by the accused when the article was uploaded. The charge sheet had only stated “with the intent to annoy another person”. The person in the charge sheet must be named clearly.

(7) The Prosecution should have also called the person intended to be annoyed by the article to testify whether the victim felt annoyed by the article. Without evidence from the victim, the Court is left wondering whether the victim felt annoyed by the article.

In Sivarasa Rasiah v Pendakwa Raya (Kuala Lumpur Criminal Sessions Court Case No. 63-001-04/2016 & 63-002-04/2016, Criminal Application No: 64-085-07/2016) and Premesh Chandran a/l Jeyachandran v Pendakwa Raya (Kuala Lumpur Criminal Sessions Court Case: WA-64-155-12/2017), the two accused were charged under s. 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998. They filed an application to refer a few constitutional issues to the High Court pursuant to s. 30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 on the ground that s. 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 is in contravention of Article 8 and 10(2)(a) of the Federal Constitution.

The Prosecution raised a preliminary objection against this application on the ground that s. 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 is settled and not in contravention of the Federal Constitution. The same Sessions Court Judge dismissed the application on the ground that the case of Nor Hisham Osman v PP [2010] MLJU 1429 has already determined that s. 233(1) of the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 is reasonable and not unconstitutional.

Fortunately for the two accused, the charges were withdrawn against them after the change of Government after the 14th General Election.

Sedition – Sex bloggers on trial

In Lee May Ling v Public Prosecutor & Another Appeal [2018] 10 CLJ 742, the Appellant, also known as Vivian of the Alvivi duo, was found guilty by the Sessions Court for an offence under s. 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948 and sentenced to an imprisonment term of five (5) months and twenty (22) days.

Vivian and her co-accused, Alvin Tan, had published a picture of themselves with the words “Selamat Berbuka Puasa (dengan Bak Kut Teh. wangi,enak, meyelerakan!!!) with the Halal logo on the Facebook page “Alvin and Vivian-Alvivi”.

She appealed against her conviction and sentence. There was also a cross-appeal by the prosecution against the inadequacy of sentence meted out by the Sessions Court Judge.

The co-accused absconded through the trial and was absent until the conclusion of the trial.  

The High Court dismissed the appeals. The learned Judge found that Vivian and Alvin Tan had a common intention to publish the picture, and that Vivian was a willing participant. Although no one saw Alvin or Vivian posting the picture, the learned Judge also made an inference from the evidence showing that the picture was kept in Alvin’s notebook and the Facebook page was registered in the name of Alvin and Vivian.

The High Court however substituted the sentence of five (5) months and twenty (22) days imprisonment with a fine in the sum of RM5,000 in default, imprisonment of six (6) months. The High Court in the same vein dismissed the prosecution’s appeal on the inadequacy of the sentence.

Official Secrets Act 1972 – Liability for receiving forwarded messages

Last year, I reported that one Subbarau @ Kamalanathan (Pendakwa Raya v Subbarau @ Kamalanathan (Court of Appeal Criminal Appeal No. N-06B-55-09/2016) was charged in the Sessions Court under s. 8(1)(c)(iii) of the Official Secrets Act 1972 (OSA 1972) for having possession in his Samsung mobile phone soft copies of 2014 UPSR examination papers.

In the same year, the Court released two more judgements relating to the possession of Ujian Penilaian Sekolah Rendah (UPSR) examination papers which they had received via forwarded messages on WhatsApp.

In Pendakwa Raya lwn Uma Mageswari A/P Periasamy @ Mayandy (Kuala Kangsar Sessions Court Criminal Case No. 61-1-11-2014) and Pendakwa Raya v Anparasu al Kadampiah (Kuala Kangsar Sessions Court Criminal Case No. 61-2-11-2014), the two school teachers were charged with possession of a few pages of examination papers for Ujian Penilaian Sekolah Rendah (UPSR) for Science 018 under s. 8(1)(c)(iii) of the Official Secrets Act 1972. Both were acquitted as the photographs of the examination papers were forwarded to them and stored automatically on their mobile phones, and they had no use for them, among others.

The prosecution of persons who possess information received via forwarded messages is a dangerous precedent. The law should make exception to those who had not knowingly received such information and chose not to delete those information thereafter.

Online and phone scams – Scammer or victim?

Online and phone scams have become common in Malaysia. The authorities had been tracking and arresting these scammers but many of them are based outside Malaysia. Instead, these scammers use the services of Malaysians, whether knowingly or not, to receive and dissipate money.

In Pendakwa Raya lwn Charles Sugumar a/l M. Karunnanithi (Kota Bharu Magistrate Court Kes Tangkap No: MKB (A) 83-43-02/2016), the accused was charged under s. s. 424 of the Penal Code for dishonestly concealing money of a scam victim in his bank account knowing that the said money does not belong to him. The victim had befriended a person by the name of Alfred Hammon from UK through Facebook. Alfred Hammon then made the victim transfer money to the accused’s bank account on the pretence that he needed the money to cash his cheque of three million dollars. Alfred Hammon promised that he will return the money together with interest. However, after transferring the money, the victim realised that she was scammed.

The accused claimed that he is not part of the scam and that when he was working as a tour driver, he was requested by his customer to receive money on the customer’s behalf. The accused claimed that he did it to give his customer the best service so that he can attract more customers. He said that he was informed by the customer that the customer’s friend had to transfer money to him so that the customer can continue his tour in Malaysia. The accused said that he did not make any remuneration or commission from that assistance.

The Magistrate acquitted the accused as the Magistrate found that, among others, the accused’s evidence is consistent and he is a credible witness. The Magistrate agreed that the accused was made a scapegoat by the customer who took advantage of his goodness and sincerity in giving the best service as a tour driver.

In Pendakwa Raya lwn Sabariah Binti Adam (Magistrate Court Criminal Trial No. 83RS – 206 – 08 / 2016), the accused was charged with two counts of knowingly concealing stolen property, an offence under s. 414 of the Penal Code. The victim was duped by a Facebook user by the name of Nasir to bank in her money into the accused’s bank account. The accused claimed that she was a victim of the same trumpery scheme and not the perpetrator. She has no control and custody over her bank account. The Court however drew inference that an account holder must be held responsible for all transaction initiated or authorised using her account number including transaction by another person whom the account holder has given permission to. The Court sentenced the accused twelve (12) months imprisonment for each charge.

However, in Pendakwa Raya lwn Hasimah Binti Aziz (Kuala Lumpur Criminal Sessions Court Case No. WA-62CY-052-08/2017), the accused was charged under s. 4(1)(b) of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 for allowing access without authorisation to her Maybank bank account and thereafter assist a scam against the complainant.

The complainant was tricked into transferring money to the accused to pay for charges to release a present purportedly sent by a person she knew from Facebook. The investigating officer found that the accused had given her automatic teller machine (ATM) card to a person she knew from Facebook. That person claimed he could not open a bank account in Malaysia.

The Court held that based on the evidence produced, it is clear that the complainant and accused were online scam victims themselves. The accused was deceived into giving her account number, ATM card and PIN number. The complainant on the other had was deceived into paying courier charges, among others. If detailed investigation was made, the main character of the scam would be revealed. There was no attempt to obtain the CCTV recording of who had taken the money from the ATM machine. The bank officer had testified that CCTV recording are stored by the bank for three (3) months. If the CCTV recording was obtained, it would reveal who had used the ATM card.

Sexual grooming – A new offence

In Syed Naharuddin Bin Syed Hashim v Etiqa Takaful Berhad (Award No.: 3143/2018), the Claimant was dismissed after the Company received an anonymous email alleging that the Claimant had been operating as a sexual predator and targeting girls as young as thirteen-years-old.

The anonymous author also alleged that the Claimant, using the pseudonym, “KBoy”, carried out his meetings with girls. It was also alleged that the Claimant’s conversations had been recorded and featured in an undercover expose by the Star newspaper team of journalists know as STAR R.AGE Team. An investigation by the Company revealed that there were two video recordings featuring K-Boy which had been uploaded onto the STAR R.AGE online website and the videos had gone viral on YouTube. The Claimant admitted that he was the individual in the video.

The Industrial Court held that the actions of the Claimant can amount to a sexual communication under the Sexual Offences Against Children Act 2017. The facts of the case which are largely admitted to by the Claimant, are that he communicated with the intended “victim” in social media and then met up with the person (who informed him that she was a young girl of 15). The setting, the time and the locale were such that a person of his standing in society and representing an insurance company should have been wary of. Further, the conversations were explicitly related to sex and sexual exploits which a man of his age has no business to discuss with a young lady, notwithstanding her real age.

The Court found that the termination was with just cause or excuse and the Claimant’s case is therefore dismissed.

E-hailing services – Naughty GrabCar driver

In Pendakwa Raya lwn Muhamad Izuwan Bin Kamaruddin (Mahkamah Magistrate Ampang No Kes: 85-55-09/2017, 83JS-16-09/2017 dan 83-780-09/2017), a GrabCar driver was charged under ss. 323, 354 and 506 of the Penal Code for assaulting his passenger. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a total of 3 years and five (5) months.

In deciding the sentence, the learned Magistrate took into account of the negative effect on the e-hailing provider GrabCar which may cause difficulty to female passengers to trust a GrabCar driver. The learned Magistrate imposed a deterrence sentence to send a message to all drivers so that they will drive ethically and treat their passengers with respect and not take advantage of then.

On another note, the Commercial Vehicle Licensing Board (Amendment) Act 2017 and Land Public Transport (Amendment) Act 2017 came to force on 12 July 2018.

These new laws introduced the licensing of intermediation business. Intermediation business is defined as “business of facilitating arrangements, booking or transactions of e-hailing vehicle (pursuant to the new amendment to CVLBA) and for the provision of land public transport services (pursuant to the new amendment to LPTA). These amendments were introduced to regulate e-hailing services such as Grab and also e-hailing vehicles.

Part 4 which focuses on commercial cases will be published on May 10.

First published on Digital News Asia on 3 May 2019

Bread & Kaya: 2018 Malaysia Cyber-law and IT Cases PT4 – Commercial cases

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By Foong Cheng Leong
May 10, 2019

– 2018 saw the first decision on the liability of online marketplace providers
– Damages can be granted in the case of a software delivery delay

IN THIS last of a four-part series, I will focus on commercial cases in 2018.

Short-term lodging – the Airbnb Effect

An online marketplace for accommodation and hospitality such as Airbnb enables people to lease or rent short-term lodging including vacation and apartment rentals, homestays, hostel beds and hotel rooms.

Currently, there are no specific laws to govern the conduct of these online marketplace providers.  However, joint management bodies and management corporations have taken action to stop apartment owners from operating short-term lodging by, among others, imposing rules to stop this practice.

In Salil Innab & Anor v Badan Pengurusan Bersama Seti Sky Residences & 5 Ors (Kuala Lumpur High Originating Summons No: WA-24NCVC-776-04/2018), the 1st Defendant, the Joint Management Body of Setia Sky Residences, took steps to stop the Plaintiffs’ services of short term rentals. The Plaintiffs, tenant and landlord of an apartment unit at a building, filed an action against the Joint Management Body to stop them from interfering or stopping any owners, tenants of any short term rental and/or any person representing the Plaintiffs from operating a short term rental at Setia Sky Residences.

The 1st Plaintiff is also a director of a company called Innab Trade Sdn Bhd. Through Innab Trade Sdn Bhd, the 1st Plaintiff had also rented other units in Setia Sky Residences for the purposes of sub-letting the same to members of the public.

The 1st Defendant contended that the business operated by the 1st Plaintiff, through Innab Trade Sdn Bhd, at Setia Sky Residences is in reality a hotel business and not merely the business of letting out short-term tenancies.

In so contending, the 1st Defendant made reference to how bookings for the short-term tenancies were made through the internet, how the units were described and marketed by using the name “KL Suites” and how they were portrayed in Innab Trade Sdn Bhd’s website, including the contention that these “KL Suites” could be booked through other websites. It is contended that all of these are similar to and in effect, the management of a hotel service.

The High Court granted an interlocutory injunction to stop the Defendants from interfering or stopping any owners, tenants of any short term rental and/or any person representing the Plaintiffs from operating a short term rental at Setia Sky Residences.

The High Court held that the 1st Plaintiff’s short-term tenants will be adversely affected and they are in reality victims of the conflict between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. In addition, the continued interference with or obstruction of the 1st Plaintiff’s short-term tenants would also be likely to cause irreparable damage to the goodwill that the 1st Plaintiff would have built in his business.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the Defendants’ appeal (Civil Appeal No. W-02(IM)(NCVC)-1811-09/2018) on the ground that the injunction order was too wide and damages is an adequate remedy.

In Verve Suites Mont’ Kiara Management Corporation v Innab Salil & 8 Ors (Kuala Lumpur High Originating Summons No: WA-22NCVC-461-09/2017), the Plaintiff, the Management Corporation of Verve Suites Mont Kiara, passed and adopted a resolution in an Extraordinary General Meeting to prohibit the use of residential units in the Verve Suites for business, including paid short-term rentals. The prohibition was then incorporated into the House Rule 3.

House Rule 3.0 states that any unit for short term rental is prohibited. House Rule 3.1(i) states any stay for which a booking was made through services/applications/websites etc, such as AirBnb, booking.com, agoda.com, klsuits.com and other similar services is considered as a short-term rental agreement.

The Defendants had allegedly caused their respective residential units in Verve Suites to be turned into a hotel room with large numbers of guests coming to check in and check out with a flurry of activities interfering with the security, quiet enjoyment and overall wellbeing of the residents in the Verve Suites.

The Plaintiff then initiated an action against the Defendants compelling them to abide by all times and not violate the House Rule and be restrained from advertising, contracting for, booking and/or allowing, dealing with the residential units to be used for business including paid short term rental and/or transient use for tourist, or hotels, among others.  

The High Court held that the Plaintiff can enforce House Rule 3 and prohibited the Defendants from running the short-term rental business.

E-commerce – Suing online marketplace operators

We saw the first decision on the liability of online marketplace providers.

In Nexgen Biopharma Research & Innovation SARL v Celcom Planet Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22IP-3-01/2018), the Intellectual Property High Court had to decide whether an online marketplace provider is liable for trademark infringement for the sale and advertisements of its Merchants’ products published on its website.

The brand owner was granted an order for summary judgement against the Defendant that operates an online marketplace by the name of “11Street” for infringing their trade mark “MFIII”. 11Street had published the MFIII trade marks and numerous sellers had posted unauthorised MFIII products for sale on 11Street. Besides, 11Street had also advertised the MFIII trade mark together with products bearing the MFIII trade marks on various third-party websites.

Similarly, in Jeunesse Global Sdn. Bhd. v Ecart Services Malaysia Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22IP-16-02/2018), the Plaintiffs, who are in the direct selling business of skin care products and supplements, sued the operator of online marketplace operator, Lazada, for trade mark infringement, passing off, copyright and unlawful interference with their business, among others. The Plaintiffs discovered that Lazada had been selling products bearing the 1st Plaintiff’s registered trade marks and publishing the 1st Plaintiff’s copyright works. However, the parties settled the matter amicably and the matter was withdrawn.

Last year, I reported that a luxury watches brand owner sued a web hosting company for trademark infringement for hosting websites that sold counterfeit products (Officine Panerai AG v Shinjiru Technology Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22IP-2-01/2018)). The interesting question in this case is whether a webhoster is liable for trade mark infringement for what their subscribers do. However, the parties also settled the matter amicably and the matter was withdrawn. 

Contractual matters – Software delivery delay and online agreements

This is an important case for the software industry. Delay in delivering a software is a common occurrence in the industry and in the High Court case of Tex Cycle Technology (M) Berhad v Fact System (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (Kuala Lumpur High Court Suit No. WA-22NCVC-379-06/2016) provides what a customer can do if there is such delay.

In this case, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant for failing to install a software which could cater for the implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) required by the Government within the date of enforcement of GST.

The Defendant had allegedly represented to the Plaintiff in meetings and exchanges of emails that the Defendant could meet the enforcement date of GST and also that two important service requirements of the contract entered into could be fulfilled.

The Plaintiff claimed that due to the Defendant’s failure, they had no alternative but to switch to manually entering the data and generating documents manually and, in the process, incurring significant costs and expenses.

The Plaintiff sued for the loss and damages and the refund of the sum of RM191,572 paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant for the software. The High Court found in favour of the Plaintiff and ordered the refund of the money paid plus general damages of RM100,000.

On appeal (Civil Appeal No. W-02(NCvC)(W)-1297-06/2018), the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and disallowed the general damages of RM100,000. The Court of Appeal held that the High Court Judge is plainly wrong in allowing RM100,000 as general damages as there were no evidential basis.

In Wong Wei Pin v Malayan Banking Berhad [2018] 6 AMR 933, the High Court dealt with an interesting point whether general terms and conditions published on a website can be incorporated into an agreement.

In this case, the Plaintiff had accumulated credit card points via business and commercial purposes which ran foul of the Defendant’s terms and conditions of the credit card which provides that the cardmember can only use the credit card for purposes of personal consumption only, i.e. non-business and non-commercial related consumption. The Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s Product Disclosure Sheet (PDS) which did not explicitly state that the terms and conditions of the Credit Card can be found at www.maybank2u.com.

The learned Judge held that although the PDS did not set out that the general terms and conditions are set out at Maybank’s website, it is accordingly the obligation of the Plaintiff to ascertain what the general terms and conditions are as she will be bound by them in the usage of the Credit Card. Accordingly, the High Court held that the Plaintiff is bound by the terms and conditions found on the Defendant’s website, and even if the Plaintiff chose not to read them, she is bound by them by her usage of the card.

In closing

In 2019, we can expect more interesting developments in the cyberlaw and IT sphere –

  1. The Council of Auctioneers Malaysia is challenging a decision by the High Court Registrar to implement electronic bidding or e-Lelong in all courts in West Malaysia (Majlis Pelelong Malaysia v. Pendaftar Mahkamah Tinggi Malaya (Kuala Lumpur Judicial Review Application No. WA-25-313-10/2018). Leave to challenge the High Court Registrar’s decision has been granted by the High Court. The High Court will now hear the substantive application in due course;
  2. Pursuant to the Capital Markets and Services (Prescription of Securities) (Digital Currency and Digital Token) Order 2019, digital currencies and digital tokens which are not issued or guaranteed by any government body or central bank, and fulfils other specific features, are prescribed as securities. The effective result of this order is that the digital currencies and digital tokens will now be primarily regulated by the Securities Commission. The Securities Commission’s Guidelines on Recognised Markets has now been amended to regulate digital asset exchange operator;  
  3. The Government will be taxing digital services beginning from Jan 1, 2020 at 6% per annum. Pursuant to the Service Tax (Amendment) Bill 2019, foreign registered persons providing digital services to consumers in the country will need to pay service tax;
  4. The introduction of the new Legal Profession Act 2018 to replace the old Legal Profession Act 1976 will see the introduction of the legal technology provision. S. 35 seeks to regulate the provision of legal technology by legal technology service provider. Legal technology is defined as any technological product or service used or to be used, (1) in the provision of any service or any act which is within any function or responsibility of any advocate and solicitor, or (2) places at the disposal of any other person the services of an advocate and solicitor. The Bar Council is given the power to regulate legal technology; and
  5. Across the causeway, Singapore has introduced the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Bill 10/2019. This new law seeks to, among others, criminalise false statements, control inauthentic behaviour and other misuses of online accounts and bots and regulate blocking orders. This new law also introduced a new way to punish persons who disseminates false statements i.e by cutting their income and starving them financially.

First published on Digital News Asia on 10 May 2019.

E-hailing firms must protect data

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I was interviewed by The Star and Free Malaysia Today on an e-hailing firm’s new user requirement to submit “selfie” for verification purposes.

In The Star’s article titled “E-hailing firms must protect data“, it was reported-

Weak enforcement of the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) has made it vital for e-commerce firms and e-hailing providers to protect such information, according to the Bar Council.

Its Information Technology and Cyber Laws Committee deputy chairman Foong Cheng Leong said there had not been much news on the enforcement of the Act .

There were cases of companies being fined, but high-profile cases such as the data breach involving telecommunications companies two years ago have yet to be resolved,’’ he said.

Welcoming the requirement of selfie verification on e-hailing passengers as an effective mechanism to protect the drivers, he said those concerned with data privacy breaches could not do much if they wanted to use the service.

Foong’s comments were in light of the concerns over data privacy following a law introduced by the Transport Ministry in July last year, requiring passengers to submit their identity credentials upon registration with any e-hailing platform”

While in Free Malaysia Today’s article titled “Password better than selfie for Grab driver safety, says consumer group“, it was reported-

Foong Cheng Leong, a lawyer, says the requirement does not run afoul of the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 as it involved obtaining the user’s consent.

“The use of Grab or any ride-hailing service is optional. Those who do not wish to submit their picture may opt not to use the service.”

In addition to the above, I would like to add that the submission of “selfie” can be a concern if there is a high risk that the data is misused. The selfie can be paired with other data for profiling purposes. Such data can be used for surveillance purpose, matching with other data, etc.

Perhaps such providers should announce how, in detail, personal data is protected, where exactly it will be stored, what measures are taken to ensure data is safe, and report whenever there is a data leakage or third party request. Most data users publish such information on their privacy policy. However, most data users publish very general information and the bare minimum, as required by the Notice & Choice Principle provided by the Personal Data Protection Act 2010.

Since it is mandatory for e-hailing users, the only choice available for users now is to not use such e-hailing services unless there is a change in policy. Users should consider filing a complaint to the Personal Data Protection Commissioner or Transport Ministry over the new rules.

BFM Podcast: PAYING USERS FOR DATA

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Facebook has launched an app that collects extra data from users in exchange for a monthly payment. We consider if that makes for a fair exchange.

Produced by: Julian Yap
Presented by: Lee Chwi Lynn, Kelvin Yee


Your browser does not support native audio, but you can download this MP3 to listen on your device.



Pay just RM150 for details of 200,000 people, RM350 for 10 million

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I was interviewed by Free Malaysia Today on the issue of the unlawful sale of personal data in Malaysia which is an offence under the Personal Data Protection Act 2010 (PDPA), in particular, s. 130 of the PDPA.

A lawyer told FMT that the sale of personal data is not surprising.

Foong Cheng Leong, who chairs the Kuala Lumpur Bar’s information technology committee, said while the sale of data is common, it is no longer done as openly as before due to PDPA which came into force in 2013.

But he said enforcement has been poor.

Despite media reports on data breaches such as the leakage of millions of mobile phone numbers two years ago, no action has been taken, Foong said.

In 2017, mobile phone numbers, identification card numbers, home addresses, IMEI and SIM card data of 46.2 million customers of at least 12 Malaysian mobile phone operators were leaked online.

“We do not know why there has been no prosecution. Perhaps due to the difficulty of conducting a data leakage investigation, data may be held by numerous data processors and rogue employees may have accessed them without permission,” said Foong.

BFM Podcast: THESE ARE NOT THE (AN)DROIDS YOU’RE LOOKING FOR

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With the rise of Android TV boxes in Malaysia, content developers as well as local film bodies are keen on shifting responsibility to users to curb piracy. Finas is taking it a step further by proposing a new paper that would hold homeowners accountable for pirated content that’s streamed on their property, regardless if they’re the tenants.

Produced by: Christine Wong
Presented by: Richard Bradbury, Arvindh Yuvaraj, & Audrey Raj



BFMPodcast: PURAJAYA ROOTS FOR TONGKAT ALI

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I was interviewed by BFM Radio over a statement by Parti Sosialis Malaysia Chief Dr Jeyakumar Devaraj regarding a warning notice by Biotropics Malaysia Berhad which has taken out a patent for the bioactive component of Tongkat Ali (Patent No. MY-134867-A – corresponding patent can be seen here). In gist, Dr Jeyakumar said that patent laws have been misused to create monopolies over a natural product like Tongkat Ali which has been used for its medicinal properties “for centuries”.

I was asked to explain what this patent is about and the scope of it.

MESTECC and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) have joint ownership of a Tongkat Ali extract- what does that mean and will this impact communities that harvested the traditional herb for centuries? We speak to an IP lawyer.

Produced by: Tasha Fusil
Presented by: Kelvin Yee, Kam Raslan, Aiman Rashad



Malindo Air’s Data Breach

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I was asked to comment on Malindo Air’s latest data breach incident by South China Morning Post, Malaysian Reserves and Global Data Review.

Malindo Air, a subsidiary of low-cost airline Lion Air, has suffered a massive data breach, resulting in the information of millions of passengers – including passport details, home addresses and phone numbers – being leaked onto data exchange forums last month.

In South China Morning Post’s article title ” Malindo Air confirms data breach, exposing millions of passengers’ personal data“, it was reported-

Cyber law and technology lawyer Foong Cheng Leong said that companies in breach of Malaysia’s Personal Data Protection Act are not under any legal obligation to notify the authorities, the public, or the victim of the leak, although this lacuna is being reviewed.

There is no data breach notification rule in Malaysia under this Act. However, there is of course a moral obligation on the part of the company to notify the subject and the public,” said Foong.

Unfortunately in Malaysia these data breaches happen often, but if nobody knows about it nothing happens. During past breaches, there were some investigations but no prosecutions and no repercussions.

In the Malaysian Reserve’s article titled “Experts call for tougher law on data breach as Malindo Air becomes latest victim“, I said-

“There should be a data breach notification law. Data subjects have the right to know that their information has been compromised and take steps to secure the data,” Bar Council’s information technology and cyber laws committee deputy chairman Foong Cheng Leong told The Malaysian Reserve in an earlier report.

He added that the Personal Data Protection Commissioner had introduced a consultative paper to propose the mandatory disclosure, but the progress has been muted so far.

Currently, parties suffering from a data leak in Malaysia are not obliged to notify the authorities or the victims.

“In Europe, under the general data protection regulation, any companies including foreign firms with an office and/or serve the European region are required to lodge a report of any data breach within 72 hours.

“Organisations face the risk of a fine up to 4% of global revenue in the event of a data breach,” Foong said.

Lastly, in Global Data Review’s article titled “Lion Air Group data breach affects more than 30 million customers“, it was reported-

Foong Cheng Leong, a partner at Foong Cheng Leong & Co in Kuala Lumpur, said Malindo Air may have fallen foul of the country’s Personal Data Protection Act. This can attract criminal sanctions: a fine up to 300,000 ringgit (€65,000) and prison sentences of up to two years.

In spite of this, Leong said enforcement may not be forthcoming. He said that the government has yet to make a prosecution under the law for a data breach in spite of “numerous high-profile data breaches” in Malaysia since the law came into force.

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Leong said Malindo Air might be liable under other data protection laws in the region. “However, it is not known if the data protection authorities will take or have the power to take any action against Malindo Air”, he said.

Leong said that the issue has drawn attention to the absence of notification requirements in Malaysia’s data protection law.

We are looking for interns!

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As an intern, you will be exposed to matters relating to cyberlaw, intellectual property, franchise and data protection laws.

Law students and graduates are encouraged to apply.

Please send your CV to mail@fcl-co [dot] com.

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